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VIABILITY AND ABORTION
INTRODUCTION
In 1972 Chief Justice Burger, dissenting from the Supreme
Court's decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird,' stated: "The com-
mands of the Constitution cannot fluctuate with the shifting
tides of scientific opinion."'2 Despite this admonition, the fol-
lowing year the Court decided Roe v. Wade,3 which leaves the
fundamental right of privacy, as it applies to abortion,4 awash
upon a very choppy sea of scientific opinion. The Court's reli-
ance on the medical concept of "viability" has created uncer-
tainty, for not only is that concept difficult to define with preci-
sion in terms of current medical knowledge, but its meaning
will undoubtedly change with the continuing advance of medi-
cal technology. Clearly, the result in Roe would have been bet-
ter had the majority heeded Chief Justice Burger's comments
in Eisenstadt and moored its ultimate holding in Roe in a more
permanent harbor than that provided by scientific opinion.
I. ROE v. WADE: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE VIABILITY STANDARD
In Roe v. Wade the Court concluded "that the right of
personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this
right is not unqualified and must be considered against impor-
tant state interests in regulation."5 The Court found that the
state has two compelling interests' which relate to abortion: an
interest in protecting maternal health7 and an interest in po-
tential human life.' However, the interests of the state are not
compelling at all times: "Each grows in substantiality as the
woman approaches term . ... I
The state's interest in protecting maternal health becomes
1 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The case involved a Connecticut statute concerning distri-
bution of contraceptives.
2 Id. at 470 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 155.
Id. at 154.
The Court stated that because a "fundamental right" is involved, any regulation
of the right must be justified by a "compelling state interest ... " Id. at 155.
Id. at 162.
'Id.
Id. at 162-63.
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compelling "at approximately the end of the first trimester."' 0
That point was chosen because "until the end of the first
trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in
normal childbirth."" The Court referred to the fact that most
laws prohibiting abortion were enacted at a time when intra-
abdominal procedures were extremely dangerous due to the
lack of antiseptic techniques and antibiotics. Thus, to the
woman, the risks attendant upon abortion were almost always
greater than the risks involved in carrying the fetus to term,
and the first abortion laws were apparently designed to protect
pregnant women from the dangers of abortion procedures.' 2 In
contrast, statistics cited by the Court indicate that modern
medical practices have made early abortion, i.e., first trimester
abortion, at least as safe as normal childbirth. Consequently,
the state's interest in protecting pregnant women from danger-
ous abortion procedures becomes compelling only at the end of
the first trimester, when abortion supposedly becomes more
hazardous than normal childbirth. After the first trimester,
therefore, the state may regulate abortion in furtherance of its
interest in maternal health.'3
,0 Id. at 163. It may be helpful to note that the normal human gestation period is
266 days or 38 weeks. However, fertilization usually occurs about two weeks after the
woman's last menstrual period. Thus, if one dates a pregnancy from the last menstrual
period, it will add about two weeks to the length of the pregnancy. Dating from the
last menstrual period is termed the "gestational method," and produces a 40 week
pregnancy, with the actual age of the fetus about two weeks less than the length of
the pregnancy. The "conceptional method" dates a pregnancy from the actual time of
conception and produces a 38-week pregnancy, with the actual age of the fetus and
the length of the pregnancy coinciding. See Comment, Roe v. Wade and the Tradi-
tional Legal Standards Concerning Pregnancy, 47 TEN'. L.Q. 715, 735-36 (1974). Thus,
when one speaks of the age of a fetus without indicating whether the gestational
method or the conceptional method of dating the pregnancy is being used, confusion
is created.
In using the term "trimester," the Court was using standard, although imprecise,
language. A trimester is, alternatively, 1/3 of the total duration of gestation (i.e., about
89 days or 12 2/3 weeks) or three months (i.e., about 90-92 days or 13 weeks). Because
these alternatives differ by a number of days, there is always some confusion when the
term "trimester" is used.
1 410 U.S. at 163.
22 Certainly one of the most carefully documented, thorough, and interesting expo-
sitions of this theory is Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral
or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative
Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Means].
"1 410 U.S. at 148-50.
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The state's interest in potential human life becomes com-
pelling at viability.' 4 The Court declared that viability is the
crucial point because "the fetus then presumably has the capa-
bility of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."' 5 The
Court went on to state that protection "of fetal life after viabil-
ity thus has both logical and biological justifications,"' 6 with-
out further explanation as to the nature of these justifications. 7
" Id. at 163. The Court defined viability as "potentially able to live outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id. at 160 (citation omitted). Other defini-
tions include: "Capability of living. A term used to denote the power a new-born child
possesses of continuing its independent existence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1737 (rev.
4th ed. 1968). "Capability of living; the state of being viable; usually connotes a fetus
that has reached 5600 grams in weight and 20 gestational weeks." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1388 (22nd ed. 1972). The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
has published guidelines for experimentation using human fetuses. They define viabil-
ity as "the ability of the fetus, after either a spontaneous delivery or an abortion, to
survive to the point of independently maintaining vital functions. . . ." Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, National Institutes of Health, Protection of Human
Subjects, Policies and Procedures, 38 Fed. Reg. 31738, 31740 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as HEW Policies]. The Supreme Court of Michigan defined a viable child as "an
unborn child whose heart is beating, who is experiencing electronically measurable
brain waves, who is discernibly moving, and who is so far developed and matured as
to be capable of surviving the trauma of birth with the aid of the usual medical care
and facilities available in the community." Larkin v. Cahalan, 208 N.W.2d 176, 180
(Mich. 1973).
,1 410 U.S. at 163.
16 Id.
" The Court has been criticized elsewhere for confusing the definition of viability
with a reason for specifying viability as the crucial point. Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924 (1973); Comment, 47 TEMIP.
L.Q., supra note 10, at 728-29. The criticism seems to be well-founded. If, as the
Supreme Court said, viability marks the point at which "the fetus. . . has the capabil-
ity of meaningful life outside the mother's womb," 410 U.S. at 163, why should it also
mark the point at which the state may proscribe removal of the fetus from the mother's
womb? The Court offered no real explanation for its choice of viability as the crucial
point and failed to explain why the state's interest in protecting potential life becomes
compelling at that point. Furthermore, there seems to be no logical reason for allowing
the state to proscribe abortion at the point when artificial means could sustain the life
of the fetus. The fact that a pregnancy has progressed to the point at which a machine
could keep the fetus alive is not a convincing justification for requiring the woman to
choose between an unwanted pregnancy and an illegal abortion. The potential life
could be protected just as effectively if the fetus were artificially sustained after abor-
tion.
On a very practical level, the Court may be granting recognition to the fact that
most abortions are sought for personal rather than medical reasons and to avoid par-
enthood rather than to avoid pregnancy per se. D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE
AND MORALITY 97 (1970). After the fetus is viable, there is the very real possibility that
the abortion will produce a living infant, thereby thwarting the very reason for which
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The Court fashioned its analysis of the limited right to
abortion around these two compelling interests, and summa-
rized its holding as follows:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attend-
ing physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of
the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the
health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in pro-
moting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if
it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.'8
This holding, and especially section (c), has raised problems
which have appeared in subsequent litigation and which ulti-
mately could result in basic changes in the nature of the lim-
ited right to abortion supposedly guaranteed in Roe.
I. THE VIABILITY QUESTION: How Is THE STANDARD DEFINED?
The Roe decision makes viability a crucial point in preg-
nancy; after that point is reached, the state may regulate or
proscribe abortion unless the procedure is necessary to preserve
the woman's life or health.'9 However, the Court did not make
clear exactly when viability is reached. Although the opinion
the abortion was sought. Note, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical
Implications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1204 (1974). If an abortion produces a living
infant, the woman can still avoid parenthood by surrendering the child for adoption.
However, this option is strictly theoretical in many instances. Some women find the
idea of surrendering a child to be much more traumatic than abortion, while other
women who would be emotionally capable of surrendering a child may be deterred by
the knowledge that certain types of infants (mainly those of minority or mixed racial
heritage) do not have good prospects for adoption. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1
PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIc AFFAIRS 47 (1971), in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION 3, 22
(M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon eds. 1974); D. SCHULDER & F. KENNEDY, ABORTION
RAP 23, 28-29 (1971).
" 410 U.S. at 164-65.
" Id. at 165.
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indicated that viability occurs at between 24 and 28 weeks,", it
also defined viability as "potentially able to live outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid,"2' and made refer-
ence to "new medical techniques such as . . . artificial
wombs. ' 2  Thus, the question is whether Roe placed viability
at 24 to 28 weeks, or whether viability will shift as medical
technology, neonatal care, and the new science of fetology
become more sophisticated, thereby placing the point at which
the fetus can survive outside of the womb ever earlier in preg-
nancy.23 This issue has arisen in several recent cases, which
indicate, through a variety of analyses, that viability is being
interpreted as a shifting phenomenon, tied to the 24 to 28-week
period only by the current state of medical technology.
22 Id. at 160. The Court cites L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, VILLIAMS OBSTETRICS
493 (14th ed. 1971) on this point. Upon checking the source, one finds that viability at
20 weeks is also mentioned.
21 410 U.S. at 160.
22 Id. at 161 (citation omitted).
21 A similar question arises with regard to the point at which the state's interest
in maternal health becomes compelling. While the Court stated that this interest
becomes compelling "at approximately the end of the first trimester," 410 U.S. at 163,
the choice of that particular time was based on the "fact ... that until the end of
the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal child-
birth." Id. The Court also indicated that this point was fixed "in light of present
medical knowledge . . . ." Id. This leaves open the question of whether, if medical
advances make second or third trimester abortions safer than normal childbirth, the
state's interest in protecting maternal health remains compelling at the point fixed in
Roe or whether the state's interest becomes compelling only at the point at which
abortion is no longer safer than normal childbirth. Conversely, if medical technology
were to be developed which made normal childbirth safer than abortion at any time,
would the state's interest in maternal health be compelling at all times during preg-
nancy? For the view that the point at which the state's interest becomes compelling
will shift with the relative safety of abortion and normal childbirth, see Note,
Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe & Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 237, n.11 and accompanying text (1974). For a discussion of the possi-
ble fluctuation between abortion safety and normal childbirth safety, see Comment,
47 TEMP. L.Q., supra note 10, at 734-35, 738. For a discussion of the constitutional
significance of the relative safety of abortion and childbirth, and for the view that
abortion at any time during the first 24 weeks of pregnancy is safer than normal
childbirth, see Means, supra note 12, at 382-401. Practically speaking, the point at
which the state's interest in maternal health becomes compelling is relatively unimpor-
tant because the regulations that may be imposed by the state at that point are
minimal when compared with the maximum level of regulation that is allowable after
viability.
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III. POST-ROE CASES: INTERPRETATION OF THE
VIABILITY STANDARD
A. Viability as a Matter for the Physician's Judgment
Wolfe v. Schroering24 involved an attack on the 1974 Ken-
tucky abortion law2 prohibiting abortions after the fetus could
"reasonably be expected to have reached viability, '2 6 except to
preserve the life or health of the woman. The plaintiffs con-
tended that by using the term "trimester" in Roe, the Supreme
Court meant to divide pregnancy into three equal segments of
approximately three months each, with the state's interests in
maternal health and in potential life becoming compelling as
the second and third trimesters, respectively, are reached. The
district court rejected this contention: "A close inspection of
the language in the Roe decision reveals that the Court spoke
only of a single trimester, the first. The Court used no language
to indicate that the stages of pregnancy, divided by points of
compelling state interests, were evenly divided." The court
did, however, recognize the tension created by the fact that the
Supreme Court not only gave a definition of viability, but also
stated that viability occurs at 24 to 28 weeks:
The question, then, is whether the [Roe] decision flatly
holds that viability occurs no sooner than 24 weeks. . . . We
think not. Viability is a condition in which the fetus "pre-
sumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb." Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. Because the point at
which viability may be ascertained varies, the state's interest
in preserving the fetus also varies as to the time it becomes
compelling. Thus, the state will have to rely on the doctors
and their medical judgment to determine viability.2
A similar analysis was used in Planned Parenthood of Cen-
2 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (three judge court).
25 Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 311.710 et seq. (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 KRS § 311.780: "Prohibition of abortion after viability-Exceptions.- No
abortion shall be performed or prescribed knowingly after the unborn child may rea-
sonably be expected to have reached viability, except when necessary to preserve the
life or health of the woman ... "
' 388 F. Supp. at 635.
2 Id. at 636.
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tral Missouri v. Danforth29 to uphold the definition of viability
found in the 1974 Missouri abortion law:3" "that stage of fetal
development when the life of the unborn child may be contin-
ued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-
supportive systems .... "31 The plaintiffs attacked the defini-
tion on the basis that it did not distinguish among trimesters
and, when taken in conjunction with another part of the stat-
ute,32 would prohibit "non-therapeutic abortions at an earlier
point than is constitutionally permissible under Roe .... 33
It was also contended that "in order to be constitutionally
valid, a statutory definition of viability should establish a spe-
cific point in gestation when the fetus is to be considered via-
ble. ' 34 The plaintiffs urged that the 24th week was an appropri-
ate point at which to place viability. 35
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, and inter-
preted Roe as leaving the decision as to when viability occurs
to the judgment of the physician involved:
We do not think it is properly the function of the legislature
or the courts to fix viability at an inflexible point in gestation.
The time when viability is achieved will vary with each preg-
nancy, and the determination of whether a fetus is viable in
a particular case must be left to the attending physician. 36
The approach taken in Wolfe and Danforth limits the
manner in which legislation may deal with the state's compel-
ling interest in potential life. Presumably, any statutory defini-
tion of viability that is based solely upon the age of the fetus
would be considered improper by the Wolfe and Danforth
219 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (three judge court), application for stay of
enforcement of Missouri House Bill No. 1211 pending appeal granted, 420 U.S. 918
(1975).
11 House Bill No. 1211, VERNON'S ANNOTATED MISSOUM STATUTES, 1975 Appendix
Pamphlet at 1 [hereinafter cited as VAMS].
3' House Bill No. 1211 § 2(2), VAMS 1975 Appendix Pamphlet at 2.
1 House Bill No. 1211 § 5, VAMS 1975 Appendix Pamphlet at 2. "No abortion
not necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother shall be performed unless the
attending physician first certifies with reasonable medical certainty that the fetus is
not viable."
11 392 F. Supp. at 1368.
34 Id.
35 Id.
3 Id.
[Vol. 64
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courts. They would require that the decision be left to the
physician, and that it be based upon all relevant factors, of
which fetal age is only one. 3 This approach allows a physician
to abort a fetus at any time during pregnancy, so long as the
fetus is not viable. Thus, a third trimester abortion, based upon
the nonviability of the fetus rather than upon the need to pre-
serve the life or health of the woman, 3 is theoretically possible.
However, this approach offers little certainty to the physician
who must decide whether an abortion may be legally per-
formed, and leaves the physician open to criminal prosecution
if, after the abortion, it is determined that the fetus was in fact
viable.39 This could have, and perhaps already has had,4" a
chilling effect: if a physician thinks there is any possibility,
however remote, that a fetus might be viable, and if there is
no point during the second or third trimesters before which the
" For a discussion of the various factors which must be considered in attempting
to determine whether a fetus is viable, see Note, Roe! Doe! Where are You?: The Effect
of the Supreme Court's Abortion Decisions, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 432, 449 (1974).
1 Whether the rationale upon vhich a third trimester abortion is based (nonvia-
bility of the fetus or need to preserve the life or health of the mother) will have
significant impact remains to be seen. For the view that the need standard imposes
no serious obstacle to obtaining a third trimester abortion, see Granfield, The Legal
Impact of the Roe and Doe Decisions, 33 JURIST 113, 118 (1973), and Note, 7 U. CAL.
DAVIS L. REV., supra note 37, at 451-53.
1 As one of the elements of an illegal abortion, the fact that the fetus was viable
would have to be proven by the prosecution. Larkin v. Cahalan, 208 N.W. 2d 176, 180-
81 (Mich. 1973). Because viability is dependent upon a number of factors, see note 37
supra, the task of proving that the fetus was viable could present serious difficulties.
However, abortion is an emotionally charged subject, and the personal feelings of
jurors might be so strong that a physician would be convicted on the basis of jurors'
personal moral beliefs rather than on the medical facts of the case. See United States
v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 78-80 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Dr. Kenneth
Edelin, recently convicted of manslaughter in Massachusetts as a result of an abortion
procedure (based on the theory that the fetus was viable and therefore its destruction
was manslaughter), has commented that the jurors at his trial did not understand the
medical facts presented to them and voted for conviction on the basis of their own
moral and political beliefs. Televised interview with Kenneth Edelin, M.D., BLACK
PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEWS, taped April 2, 1975. Reversal at the appellate level would
be slight satisfaction to a physician whose reputation and practice had been harmed
by a criminal abortion conviction.
1 It is open to question whether there are currently any physicians in Kentucky
who are regularly performing second trimester abortions, due in part to uncertainty
as to how courts will interpret viability. Interview with Robert Shier, M.D., Depart-
ment of Obstetrics & Gynecology, University of Kentucky Medical Center, in Lexing-
ton, Kentucky, March 24, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Interview with Robert Shier,
M.D.]. See also Louisville Courier-Journal, April 8, 1975, at A-1, col. 3.
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fetus is legally presumed to be nonviable, the physician will not
risk prosecution by performing an abortion after the first
trimester.'
B. Presumption of Nonviability Before 24 Weeks
In Hodgson v. Anderson42 an attack was launched on the
1974 Minnesota abortion law,43 which defines viability as "able
to live outside the womb even though artificial aid may be
required. During the second half of its gestation period a fetus
shall be considered potentially 'viable.' "" Another part of the
statute proscribes abortions after viability except upon the
written certification of the physician that the abortion is neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the woman, 5 while a third
section requires that any postviability abortion be "performed
under circumstances which will reasonably assure the live birth
and survival of the fetus." 46
The plaintiffs argued that the statutory definition contra-
vened Roe, in that the latter placed viability at 24 to 28 weeks,
while the statute placed it at 20 weeks.47 The defendants count-
ered that Roe did not prescribe any particular point during
pregnancy at which viability occurs, and that a 20-week cutoff
point constituted a reasonable legislative determination. The
court held the definition unconstitutional, stating:
We do not accept the suggestion of the defendants that the
Supreme Court's comment on viability was only dicta. It
appears to this Court that after reviewing the historical, med-
ical, and legal attitudes on abortions, the Supreme Court
11 With the further development of medical technology, it is conceivable that
viability could intrude upon the first trimester, thereby allowing state regulation even
during that period. See note 81 infra.
42 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974) (three judge court), appeal dismissed for
want of jurisdiction sub nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
43 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.411 (Supp. 1975-76).
4 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.411(2) (Supp. 1975-76).
5 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(3)(2)(Supp. 1975-76): "It shall be unlawful to per-
form an abortion when the fetus is potentially viable unless: (2) the attending physi-
cian certifies in writing that in his best medical judgment the abortion is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman. .... "
" MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(3)(3)(Supp. 1975-76).
" The 20-week figure was reached by using the gestational method of dating
pregnancy. See note 10 supra.
[Vol. 64
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concluded that as between cases the point of viability will
vary, and whether or not the fetus is in fact viable must be
left to the medical judgment of the physician. In any event,
under present technology, it does not arise prior to 24 weeks.
It appears that the Court made its comments on viability to
prevent the very thing that has happened here, which is the
attempt to set viability by legislative definition and thereby,
in effect, unreasonably interfere with what the Court has de-
termined to be a fundamental right."
Essentially, the Hodgson court indicated that under Roe the
state could not arbitrarily designate a particular point during
pregnancy as the point at which the fetus becomes viable. Ac-
cording to Hodgson, the determination of viability is a medical
question rather than a legal question, and must be answered
by the physician on a case-by-case basis. The court also noted
that, considering the current state of medical technology, it
would presume that a fetus is not viable at any time prior to
24 weeks.
The practical effect of Hodgson is to permit abortions until
at least 24 weeks, under the presumption that viability does not
occur prior to that time, and to allow abortions after 24 weeks
if, in the physician's judgment, the fetus is not viable. This
approach has the virtue of offering the physician some degree
of certainty as well as flexibility; the fetus is presumed nonvia-
ble prior to 24 weeks but an abortion after 24 weeks is permit-
ted if the fetus is nonviable ." However, the actual viability of
the fetus is still open to review in abortions performed after 24
weeks, and, given the difficulty of accurately determining fetal
viability and the severity of the potential consequences of an
error in judgment, physicians are likely to remain hesitant to
perform such abortions. Moreover, the actual length of the
pregnancy and age of the fetus are open to litigation in all
abortions, with the physician subject to criminal sanctions if
the prosecution can prove that the fetus was in fact older than
378 F. Supp. at 1016.
' Current medical techniques are such that diagnosis of a defect or a disease that
might render a fetus nonviable is often not possible until relatively late in the preg-
nancy. See D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE & MORALITY 93 (1970); Note, Abortion
After Roe & Doe: A Proposed Statute, 26 VAND. L. REv. 823, 829 (1973).
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
24 weeks." Because there is always some degree of error in
judging the length of pregnancy and the age of a fetus,' the
practical effect of this post-facto review may be to establish a
cutoff point for abortions some weeks before the 24-week figure
designated by the court.
C. Presumptive Lack of Viability During the First Trimester
In Larkin v. Cahalan52 the Supreme Court of Michigan was
called upon to interpret that state's assaultive abortion13 and
manslaughter by abortion 4 statutes in light of the Roe deci-
sion. The court held that, as used in the statutes, the word
"child" referred to:
a viable child in the womb of its mother; that is, an unborn
child whose heart is beating, who is experiencing electroni-
cally measurable brain waves, who is discernibly moving, and
who is so far developed and matured as to be capable of
510 One of the points alleged in the manslaughter prosecution of Dr. Kenneth Ede-
lin in Massachusetts was that the aborted fetus was actually older than the 20 to 22
weeks that Dr. Edelin estimated. Guild Notes, March, 1975, at 4, col. 1.
1' In addition to the two methods of dating a pregnancy which were mentioned in
note 10 supra, and the fact that statutes and courts are usually silent as to which
method is referred to, there are other problems. When dating a pregnancy from the
patient's last menstrual period, a physician must necessarily rely upon information
provided by the patient. Such information is often erroneous. Interview with Robert
Shier, M.D., supra note 40. Other methods of dating a pregnancy, such as uterine size,
degree of vigor exhibited by the fetus, quality of fetal heart tones (with or without
amplification) and use of ultra-sound to determine fetal size, all involve a rather
subjective evaluation on the part of the physician. The physician's estimate as to the
age of the fetus may also include an error factor of as much as plus or minus four weeks.
Deposition of Ronald Lubbe, M.D., at 29, Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D.
Ky. 1974) (three judge court) [hereinafter cited as Deposition of Lubbe].
52 208 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1973).
" MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (1968): "WILFUL KILLING OF UNBORN QUICK
CHILD-The wilful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of such
child, which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be
deemed manslaughter."
"' MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.323 (1968): "DEATH OF QUICK CHILD OR MOTHER
FROM USE OF MEDICINE, ETC., WITH INTENT TO DESTROY SUCH CHILD-Any person who shall
administer to any woman pregnant with a quick child any medicine, drug or substance
whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other means, with intent thereby
to destroy such child, unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of
such mother, shall, in case the death of such child or of such mother be thereby
produced, be guilty of manslaughter."
[Vol. 64
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surviving the trauma of birth with the aid of the usual medi-
cal care and facilities available in the community."
The court left the question of viability to be determined by the
trier of fact on the basis of the evidence offered. 6 On the issue
of whether Roe had limited the compelling nature of the state's
interest in potential life to sometime after 24 to 28 weeks, the
court said: "By reason of Roe v. Wade, we are compelled to rule
that as a matter of federal constitutional law, a fetus is conclu-
sively presumed not to be viable within the first trimester of
pregnancy.""7 Without the benefit of further explanation from
the court, it is difficult to understand how this conclusion was
reached. While Roe made it clear that there can be no state
regulation of abortion in the first trimester, because neither the
state's interest in maternal health nor its interest in potential
life is compelling during that period,"8 that opinion also indi-
cated that, given current medical technology, the state's inter-
est in potential life does not become compelling until approxi-
mately 24 to 28 weeks. 9 Thus, Larkin's conclusive presumption
of nonviability during the first trimester appears inconsistent
with the flexible standards of Roe. By defining the presumption
in this manner, the Michigan court has chosen a point which
seems too early, in terms of present medical knowledge, but
which may one day be too late, if medical advances continue
to expand the period of viability."
Although Larkin theoretically allows post-first trimester
abortions based upon the physician's medical judgment that
the fetus is not viable, the practical effect of the Larkin analy-
sis is to leave all such abortions open to post-facto review. As
indicated by the preceding discussion on the impact of such
review, it seems clear that this approach will probably decrease
the number of post-first trimester abortions.
", 208 N.W.2d at 180.
5 The court specifically provided for the admissibility of scientific evidence on the
question of viability. Id.
57 Id.
410 U.S. at 163-64.
' Id. at 160.
" See note 81 infra.
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IV. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE VIABILITY STANDARD
AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
The four cases discussed above exemplify some of the pos-
sible approaches to the viability problem. Despite the differing
results reached in these cases, two points stand out: 1) each of
the cases relied, to some degree, upon the physician's judgment
to determine viability, and 2) the one court that gave any effect
to the Supreme Court's reference to 24 to 28 weeks as the point
at which viability occurs, did so only in light of present medical
technology. Wolfe and Danforth left the question of viability
solely to the physician, regardless of the length of pregnancy or
the age of the fetus. 1 Hodgson left the question of viability to
the physician's judgment after 24 weeks, but was careful to
indicate that the 24-week figure is dependent upon "present
technology." 2 Under Larkin, the decision is within the physi-
cian's discretion after the first trimester.3
A. The Physician's Judgment
It seems clear from these cases that, in general, the ques-
tion of viability will be left to the physician's judgment. The
problems that are likely to result from this approach have been
discussed in relation to the individual cases. Briefly, when a
physician is called upon to make a complex medical judgment,
such as that of viability, with the knowledge that criminal
sanctions may be invoked if the wrong decision is made and
with the knowledge that the decision will be reviewed by the
courts after the fact, there will be a chilling effect.64 Fewer
physicians will be willing to perform abortions and more
women will be forced to choose between a dangerous, illegal
abortion and the birth of an unwanted child, with its attendant
responsibilities and disabilities.
11 Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 636 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (three judge court).
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Mo.
1975) (three judge court), application for stay of enforcement of Missouri House Bill
No. 1211 pending appeal granted, 420 U.S. 918 (1975).
11 Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1016 (D. Minn. 1974) (three judge
court), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420
U.S. 903 (1975).
63 Larkin v. Cahalan, 208 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Mich. 1973).
1, See note 40 supra.
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A possible solution to this problem is the establishment of
a subjective standard on the question of viability: If a physi-
cian in good faith believes that the fetus is nonviable, an abor-
tion should be legal, regardless of whether or not the fetus is
in fact viable. There are at least two reasons for utilizing a
subjective standard. First, there is no single, simple, positive-
or-negative laboratory test or examination technique to deter-
mine whether a fetus is viable. The medical judgment as to
viability involves a number of variables, including the length
of pregnancy, 5 the race and weight of the fetus,6 whether the
lungs of the fetus can be inflated, 7 the multiparity of the
woman,"8 and the presence or absence of maternal diabetes. 9
It is a difficult judgment to make: "Even in the most experi-
enced hands, the length of the gestational period can be diffi-
cult to determine. '70 Further, no other medical judgment is
subject to criminal sanctions if it should prove to be wrong.
Thus, based upon the difficulty inherent in making the judg-
ment and the serious consequences that attach to this particu-
lar judgment if it is in error, the physician's good faith belief
that the fetus was nonviable should constitute a total defense
to a criminal abortion prosecution. Second, due to the emotion-
ally charged nature of abortion, it may be easier to find physi-
cians who will testify against a fellow member of the profession
in an abortion case than in a malpractice case. 7' The moral
beliefs of such witnesses could affect their testimony on the
question of whether the accused should have known that the
aborted fetus was viable. By utilizing a subjective standard,
the question would not be whether the accused should have
known that the fetus was viable, but whether the accused did
in fact believe that the fetus was viable. The only issue would
be the good faith of the accused physician.
See Note, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV., supra note 37, at 449.
c See id.
HEW Policies, supra note 14, at 31740.
c' See Comment, 47 TEMP. L.Q., supra note 10, at 736.
See id.
70 Note, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV., supra note 37, at 433.
7, Televised interview with Kenneth Edelin, M.D., BLACK PERSPECTIVE ON THE
NEws, taped April 2, 1975. The emotionally charged nature of abortion also affects the
jury, to the further detriment of the physician on trial. See note 39 supra.
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There is British precedent for using a subjective, good
faith standard when dealing with the physician's decision to
perform an abortion. The 1967 Abortion Act72 delineates the
conditions under which an abortion may be performed 73 and
prescribes severe sanctions for abortions which are not per-
formed in accordance with the statute.7 4 An abortion "is lawful
if any two registered practitioners have, in good faith, formed
the opinion and have certified their opinions. . . .-17 that the
circumstances meet the criteria as set out in the statute. The
British statute differs from the solution suggested here only in
that it requires two good faith opinions rather than one. The
British experience seems to indicate that a subjective, good
faith standard on the question of the physician's judgment as
to viability would be a practical method of freeing the physi-
cian from the constraints imposed by post-facto review.
B. Artificial Viability
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court defined a viable fetus
as one "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb,
albeit with artificial aid"7 and stated that such "[v]iability
is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may
occur earlier, even at 24 weeks. ' 77 The cases subsequent to Roe
clearly indicate that these statements are being interpreted by
courts and legislatures to mean that viability occurs at 24 to
2 ABORTMN AcT 1967, c. 87.
23 Abortion is permitted if two physicians certify in good faith, that the continu-
ance of the pregnancy:
(1) would involve a greater risk to the life of the pregnant woman than the
termination of the pregnancy; or
(2) that it would involve a greater risk of injury to the physical or mental
health of the pregnant woman than the termination of the pregnancy; or
(3) that it would involve a greater risk to the physical or mental health of
any existing children of the pregnafht woman's family than the termination
of the pregnancy; or
(4) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer
from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.
Addison, The Impact of the Abortion Act 1967 in Great Britain, 38 MEDICO-LEGAL J.
15 (1970).
1, Id. at 17.
7 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
78 410 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added).
77 Id.
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28 weeks, given today's medical technology.78
This interpretation raises the question of whether the de-
velopment of means of artificially sustaining fetal life outside
of the uterus should affect the legal concept of viability; i.e., is
"artificial viability" 79 within the meaning of the term "viabil-
ity" as used in Roe? The answer to this question has important
implications for the future, because viability marks the point
at which the state's interest in potential life becomes compel-
ling."0 If, as the post-Roe cases suggest, the answer to this ques-
tion is affirmative, then as medical technology renders fetuses
viable at earlier points during gestation 8 there will be a con-
comitant movement of the point at which the state's interest
in potential life becomes compelling. 2 The most obvious result
of such movement is that abortions will be proscribed and sub-
ject to criminal sanctions at earlier points during gestation.
The amount of time available for diagnosis and decision-
making will shrink, thereby making it increasingly difficult for
11 Although three of the cases mentioned the 24 to 28-week figure, one proceeded
to ignore it, Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 636 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (three judge
court); one stated that "the Supreme Court did not elect to preempt the physician's
judgment," Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1368
(E.D. Mo. 1975) (three judge court), application for stay of enforcement of Missouri
House Bill No. 1211 pending appeal granted, 420 U.S. 918 (1975); and one qualified
its mention by reference to "present technology," Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp.
1008, 1016 (D. Minn. 1974) (three judge court), appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction sub nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975). Larkin v. Cahalan,
208 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1973) did not refer to the 24 to 28-week figure.
7' This phrase refers to viability that is dependent upon some artificial means.
410 U.S. at 163.
" Developments in medical techniques will one day render fetuses viable at early
stages of gestation. Viability at 12 to 14 weeks has been mentioned, Note, 7 U. CAL.
DAVIS L. REv., supra note 37, at 450-51, and even earlier dates are possible, Comment,
47 TEip. L.Q., supra note 10, at 737. In the geographical area served by Cincinnati
hospitals, 20 to 30-week fetuses had only approximately a 10% chance of survival in
1965; today, in the same area, 20 to 30-week fetuses have a 25% to 30% chance of
survival. Improved technology and increased experience in caring for early fetuses are
responsible for the increased survival rates. Deposition of Lubbe, supra note 51, at 41,
42. Also, the continued development and increased availability of prostaglandins will
produce greater numbers of viable fetuses, not because prostaglandins make the fetus
viable at an earlier point, but because prostaglandins do not injure the fetus as do other
methods of abortion (e.g., saline or suction). Note, 26 STAN. L. Rav., supra note 17, at
1194; Interview with Robert Shier, M.D., supra note 40.
82 See Comment, 47 TEAMP. L.Q., supra note 10, at 737; Note, 7 U. CAL. DAVIs L.
REV., supra note 37, at 434-36.
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many women to obtain safe, legal abortions.83 In time, it may
even develop that conception and viability will be cotermi-
nous,84 thus resurrecting the system under which abortion is
available only to preserve the life or health of the woman. In
view of these undesirable possibilities, the wisdom of including
artificial viability within the legal definition of viability seems
questionable.
On a practical level, the decision in Roe appears to em-
body a compromise designed to balance the interests of those
who feel that a woman has a right to control her own biological
functions with the interests of those who feel that a fetus has a
right to be carried to term. From this perspective, the choice
of naturally occurring viability as the point at which abortion
may be proscribed is both functional and sensible. It occurs at
a point that is far enough advanced to allow adequate time for
diagnosis and decision-making, thus accommodating the
woman's right to control her biological functions. Moreover, it
roughly coincides with the point at which, because of fetal size,
danger to maternal health, and personal distaste, most physi-
cians would refuse to perform an abortion anyway,85 thus ac-
commodating those who feel that the fetus has a right to be
carried to term. In contrast, there is less justification for allow-
ing the state to proscribe abortion at the point of artificial
viability. Because artificial viability would occur much earlier
during pregnancy, physicians would have less motivation
(based on fetal size, danger to maternal health, or personal
distaste) to refuse to perform an abortion than they would have
after natural viability occurs. For the same reason, prohibition
of abortion at artificial viability and thereafter would severely
" The time factor is especially important among young, poor, unmarried women,
who often lack knowledge of the symptoms of pregnancy or believe that other bodily
conditions can produce the same symptdms, and who obviously have a strong motiva-
tion to deny to themselves as well as to others that they might be pregnant. Among
this group, the woman may wait until the pregnancy is obvious before consulting a
physician, at which point it is usually well into the gestation period. Televised inter-
view with Kenneth Edelin, M.D., BLACK PERSPEcrIVE ON THE NEWS, taped April 2, 1975.
In addition, even when the pregnancy is diagnosed early, the woman would be under
the pressure of an early deadline while making a decision as to whether to have an
abortion.
U See note 81 supra.
'5 See Comment, 47 TarMp. L.Q., supra note 10, at 736; Note, 7 U. CAL. DAvis L.
REV., supra note 37, at 453.
[Vol. 64
COMMENTS
limit the ability of the woman to obtain a legal, safe abortion,
and would probably increase the number of dangerous, illegal
operations.
This analysis demonstrates that the concept of viability as
the point at which the state's interest in potential life becomes
compelling, and thus the point at which the state may pro-
scribe abortions, should be limited to natural viability, and
should not be extended to include the artificial viability that
will undoubtedly be engendered by future medical technology.
As Chief Justice Burger indicated in Eisenstadt," the rights
that are protected by the Constitution cannot rise and fall with
medical technology.
CONCLUSION
By placing the compelling state interest in potential life at
the point of viability, the Supreme Court left to the physician's
judgment the determination of whether the state has a compel-
ling interest in any particular case. Given the emotionally
charged nature of the issue and the possible imposition of crim-
inal sanctions, physicians will be unwilling to perform abor-
tions after the first trimester if their professional judgment as
to the viability of the fetus is open to post-facto review. In order
to avoid this result it is necessary to establish a subjective, good
faith standard by which the physician's judgment as to viabil-
ity will be measured.
By referring to "artificial means" in its definition of viabil-
ity, the Supreme Court has defined a fundamental right in
terms of a scientific concept that is uncertain at the present
time and likely to change in the future. In order to maintain
the balance between competing interests which the Court
struck in Roe, viability should be interpreted to mean only
natural viability.
The flexibility of the Roe decision has been praised: "By
focusing on compelling state interests rather than the tradi-
tional trimesters of pregnancy, Roe has achieved a flexibility
which will allow it to survive in a world of rapidly changing
" Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 470 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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medical technology.""7 That view seems too sanguine in light
of the problems discussed above. Although the flexibility in
Roe may allow the opinion to survive, it could easily destroy
the right which the opinion sought to guarantee. Only by ex-
empting the accuracy of the physician's judgment concerning
viability from post-facto review and by limiting the legal defi-
nition of viability to natural viability, will the limited right to
abortion which Roe sought to insure continue to be a reality.
Chris Macaluso
87 Comment, 47 TEIP. L.Q., supra note 10, at 738.
